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White Gold: Tracing the Illicit Elephant Ivory Trade
Conversation surrounding drug and arms trafficking continues to dominate the political
sphere as policymakers from around the world investigate the illicit global economy; however,
illegal wildlife trade has become an increasingly significant, yet overlooked issue within political
discourse. From small specimens of sea horse to parts of lions, tigers, and bears, the increasing
demand for animals and their by-products around the world fuels an illegal market worth up to
US$20 billion, undermining wildlife conservation, biodiversity, and global security (Duffy 2010,
18). Although constituting a small percentage of this demand for illicit wildlife products,
consumers seek elephant ivory for its aesthetic appeal, medicinal properties, and cultural
significance (Barron 2015, 218). China remains the world’s largest consumer of this “white
gold,” where over 70 percent of the world’s ivory consumption takes place (BBC 2015).
Moreover, East Africa serves as the dominant region for elephant poaching, where populations
have decreased by 30 percent within the past seven years (Chockshi and Gettleman 2016). What
once seemed like a trivial niche market has now created a variety of issues, pressuring
governments around the globe to initiate response. By examining the vast network of the illegal
ivory supply chain (primarily between Tanzania and China) each phase of the trade process
reveals significant social, political, and economic implications that continue to intrigue scholars
analyzing the international political economy today.
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According to The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a non-profit
organization that seeks to understand the culprits of global conflict, “Tanzania is the epicenter of
the current poaching crisis” (Vira et al. 2014, 8). Officially a unitary republic, corruption within
the Tanzanian political structure remains highly prevalent and delivers negative ramifications to
all sectors of the economy: “The most affected sectors are government procurement, land
administration, taxation, and customs” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2016). Under the
Prevention and Combating Corruption Act (PCCA), corruption is criminalized; yet, a lack of
stable institutions and non-compliance among government agencies continues to undermine
government integrity. Shortages in funding and overall institutional inefficiency incites
government officials to seek out petty corrupt practices for a more desirable compensation. For
the illegal ivory trade, corruption and government instability provide the ideal environment for
poachers lurking around Tanzania’s “protected” wildlife areas. Evidence of corruption within the
political structure expands the argument that government intervention, or rather non-intervention,
has profound effects on the dynamics of trade.
At the receiving end of the trade route, China remains the world’s top consumer for
elephant ivory. Interestingly, China was not always geared toward high patterns of consumption
until around the end of the 20th century, when the country was liberated from the economic
shackles of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Prior to the late 1970s,
Chinese citizens saved more and spent less simply because the country’s economic conditions
did not allow for casual spending on luxury goods like ivory. Following the death of Chairman
Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping introduced “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a mixed
economy, to China (Schoppa 2011, 153). These new liberal economic policies relied more on
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market forces, privatized businesses, and established low-tax economic zones to incentivize
foreign investment. Maintaining synergy between trade liberalization and a powerful state to
direct credit, China’s economy enjoyed an extraordinary boom in the 1990s, leading to an overall
increase in consumption and an impressive middle class (Schoppa 2011, 153). Chinese citizens
were then able to broaden their scope of demand for normal goods such as ornaments carved
from ivory. In her book Nature Crime: How We’re Getting Conservation Wrong, Rosalyn Duffy
dispels the belief that the illegal ivory trade is driven by poor communities in Africa: “As with
other products such as rice and cotton, the direction of the wildlife trade is mostly from the
poorer parts of the world to richer parts of the world” (Duffy 2010, 17). Advanced nations like
China with an emerging consumer culture encourage poachers in the African savannas to exploit
their comparative advantage in attaining large quantities of elephant ivory (Strauss 2015). With
high demand on the line, poachers in African countries like Tanzania turn to elephants for a quick
profit, whether to feed their families or finance an ongoing crime operation.
Unlike commodities that are grown or manufactured, an elephants must be hunted for
their profitable ivory tusks. Poachers spend a great of time tracking down elephants to kill,
putting themselves at risk of being trampled or encountering other dangers in the wilderness.
Many poachers have familiarized themselves with stealthy and effective hunting strategies. A
recent documentary titled The Ivory Game provides a thrilling glimpse into how advanced
poachers use technology such as gun silencers, tracking devices, and night vision equipment to
increase their chances for a successful hunt (Davidson and Ladkani 2016). The use of advanced
hunting methods and equipment indicates that elephant poaching takes place on very intricate
level, often involving multiple individuals who are paid by organized crime syndicates. The
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C4ADS report, “Out of Africa,” supports this claim by concluding that “while there is still
opportunistic poaching driven by the relatively high local value of ivory, most local poaching
appears to source to, or have been entirely co-opted by, organized criminal networks” (Vira et al.
2014, 15). Similar to wide-scale illegal drug trafficking, individuals cooperate by dividing and
specializing labor to meet demand efficiently, and avoid running into the law. One essential actor
is the “financier,” who functions behind the scenes to facilitate a system of poachers by
providing weapons, ammo and other essentials. The financier will also hire informants to avoid
confrontations with law enforcement during transportation. (Vira et al. 2014 28). Every
interaction of the process becomes capitalized, requiring a stable financial mechanism to keep
operations efficient and in-tact.
With a seemingly foolproof structure in place, poachers exploit the vast conservation
parks sustaining thousands of elephants and other wildlife, which are often too large for rangers
to monitor completely. At a forum hosted by the Richardson Center for Global Engagement, the
World Wildlife Fund, and African Parks, Lisa Brown and Dr. Sam Wasser of the University of
Washington present their research on DNA samples taken from large ivory seizures en route to
Asia and trace their origin to elephants from the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania, suggesting
that the majority of poached elephants are frequently killed in “hotspots” over short periods of
time (Brown and Wasser 2013, 27). After an elephant or a group of elephants has been killed,
poachers then mutilate the cephalic region to extract as much ivory as possible. Tusks require a
great deal of butchering to be completely removed because they are so deeply embedded in the
skull. Poachers may also take meat or hide from the elephant and proceed to leave the animal to
decay in the dry savanna (Davidson and Ladkani 2016). Once the tusks are successfully
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extracted, poachers sell them to criminal networks and continue hunting as the ivory moves to
the consolidation phase to be processed for its journey to China.
The small percentage of retail value payed out to a poacher can mean a month’s worth of
income, but as the ivory makes its way through a complex transportation network to the Chinese
market, the initial transaction seems ridiculously minuscule (Save the Elephants 2016). C4ADS
recognizes the “‘African local transport’” stage of the supply chain, where a network of
“consolidators” receive and package the raw ivory to exchange with Asian traffickers (Vira et al.
2014, 16). Often coming out of extremely rural areas with poorly regulated infrastructure, the
ivory travels hundreds of miles to an export region to undergo containerization. Some ivory
consignments may be transported by air; however, sea transport remains the primary method
because traffickers can seamlessly integrate their illicit operations within legal modes of
transportation and avoid costly seizures (Vira et al. 2014, 18). According to information gathered
by CITES, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and TRAFFIC
concerning large-scale (>500kg) ivory seizures, 72 percent of the total weight was transported by
sea (CITES et al. 2014, 14). The ivory export hub is primarily centered around Eastern Africa
where ports in Tanzania and Kenya receive up to 80 percent of large-scale ivory shipments.
Consolidators will outfit a standard 20 to 30 foot container with up to 3 tons of ivory and
disguise the consignment with “innocent” materials like timber, sea shells, and cashew nuts.
Financiers also pay handsome sums to corrupt customs agents and judiciary officials, thus
completely dismantling enforcement: “The nexus between criminal syndicates and corrupt
freight logisticians may be particularly important, as without legitimate freight forwarders and
shipping agents to help obscure the paperwork and the true consignment details, consignments
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would be much more vulnerable to interception” (Vira et al. 2014, 18-19). Facilitated by a shady
co-op of financiers, poachers, consolidators, and corrupt agents, ivory consignments make their
way to a “staging area” to be sold to either another trafficking organization or transported
internationally—perhaps to the free-trade powerhouse of Hong Kong. (Vira et al. 2014, 29).
As the supply enters the busy ports in East Africa, the interaction between illicit and licit
actors becomes more apparent. Domestic import-export companies involved in agricultural trade
act as “cosigners and consignees” that often serve no other purpose than construing logistics to
accelerate the transport of illegal wildlife products like ivory. These indications show how proper
enforcement remains difficult when corrupt clearing agents and customs officers become
involved in the very crime they supposedly pledge to stop: “without such facilitators, there is no
easy means for ivory trafficking syndicates to move their product” (Vira et al. 2014, 29-30).
Once the ivory is successfully integrated within licit trade, consignments make their way to
“wholesalers” based in East Asia, predominantly China. Due to the higher chances of being
seized in East Asia, C4ADS notes that “many ivory shipments appear to funnel through a small
number of ‘chokepoints’” to divert enforcement (Vira et al. 2014, 22). Featured in the 2016
documentary, The Ivory Game, wildlife investigator Hongxiang Huang goes undercover to
examine how Chinese ivory wholesalers utilize the poorly enforced Vietnamese village of Nhi
Khe as a transport node. Huang’s hidden camera shows a conversation between himself and
Chinese wholesalers as they discuss how they are able to transport over US$1,300 worth of ivory
into China by securing an “off-the-books” Vietnamese bank account, allowing the buyer to pay
by simply depositing money. The dealers also explain how Vietnamese and Chinese border patrol
agents are paid to look the other way when a consignment is being transported (Davidson and
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Ladkani 2016). Although not all transactions enjoy such a secure and complex trade route, the
situation depicted in The Ivory Game suggests how the trade has become dangerously
professionalized by intelligent businessmen.
Now in its final destination, raw ivory is distributed to carvers or carving factories to be
made into valuable ornaments worth thousands or even millions of dollars (Vira et al. 30).
Although worldwide ivory trade was banned in 1989, China received approval from CITES to
make a one-time purchase of 73 tons to consolidate into a legal market (Bale 2015). Many
experts speculate that the existence of a legal ivory system has allowed for illegal ivory
laundering, making it difficult to distinguish the source of finished ivory products. Licensed
ivory retailers can easily establish connections with illegal traffickers to increase their stockpiles
and gain a competitive edge in this posh market. Chinese organized crime units like the Triad
have also turned to centralizing control over carving factories to reap benefits beyond trafficking
(Vira et al. 2014, 30). Once marketed at US$450 per kilogram in 2010, the wholesale value of
illegal ivory in China increased to US$2,100 per kilogram in 2014—over four times the former
value (Vira et al 2014, 37). On the contrary, the value of raw ivory at the collection phase in
Tanzania is only about US$50-$100 per kilogram. Lucrative opportunities in the illegal ivory
trade are simply more attractive, making the law seem fiscally unreasonable. In a booming
Chinese economy structured around an increasingly liberal economic framework, individuals
succumb to the forces of the market and seek out their own self-interests, even if that means
possibly undermining law or the sociopolitical structure.
Now that the illegal wildlife market has manifested as a global threat to the environment
and global security, national governments have increased their efforts to regulate wildlife trade
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through comprehensive policies and trade agreements—the most important being the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), a multilateral
treaty aimed at protecting endangered species like African Elephants. “Fears about the impact of
the wildlife trade on species conservation led to the development of CITES in 1973, and it came
into force in 1975,” according to Rosaleen Duffy in her book, Nature Crime. “Membership is
voluntary and is made of national governments” (Duffy 2010, 46). Headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland, the CITES Secretariat collects and distributes data to other members states and
organizes the Conference of Parties (CoP) every two years to assess relevant issues and make
decisions accordingly. Each of the 183 member states has a National Management Authority that
consists of one or more “‘Scientific Authority’” to provide assessments on how trade patterns
might threaten certain species of flora and fauna (Duffy 2010, 47). To establish the criteria for
regulated wildlife trade, CITES implements a system of three Appendices. Species listed under
Appendix I are strictly banned from trade, while trading species listed under Appendix II is
allowed under certain restrictions. Appendix III species are characterized when at least one
country has requested other CITES members to help control the trade. African elephants,
however, constitute a problematic “‘split listing’” between Appendix I and II because countries
like China have lobbied for less restrictions on the grounds of “cultural significance.” Despite
CITES being an international organization (IO), Duffy argues that “it is still heavily reliant on
national-level informants and monitoring” (Duffy 2010, 47).
With national interests at play, policymakers rarely approach the illicit wildlife trade
without assuming an underlying agenda. Government officials promoting an economic liberal
stance might actually consider eliminating wildlife trade restrictions altogether to preserve the

.
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integrity of the market, naming trade restrictions as the primary cause for extensive black
markets. Allowing unrestricted flows of wildlife products between countries would create overall
efficiency and absolute gains by meeting demand and improving the livelihoods of African
hunters with a steady income. Rosaleen Duffy refers to the creation of Kruger National Park in
South Africa to construct her argument that multilateral conservation efforts can bring negative
consequences by displacing communities in the name of conservation. Residents who relied on
the area designated for Kruger National Park for sustenance were instead labeled as “criminals”
who threaten the biodiversity of the so-called “manufactured Eden” (Duffy 2010, 56). On the
other hand, some policymakers use a more realist approach in response to the illegal ivory trade.
From a mercantilist (realist) perspective, government response to the illicit wildlife trade
is understood as an attempt to advance the interests of the state. In his article, “How the Illegal
Wildlife Trade is Fueling Armed Conflict,” David H. Barron cites how “in 2013 the Director of
National Intelligence testified before congress that the ‘illicit trade in wildlife…threatens to
disrupt the rule of law in important countries around the world’” (Barron 2015, 221). While the
United States may genuinely care about the near-extinction of elephants, it is difficult to see
exactly where intention lies beneath all the interstate decision-making. Director Barron exhibits
some mercantilist sentiments by emphasizing how illegal wildlife products like ivory pose an
ominous threat to the virtuous “rule of law” of the United States. Moreover, he continues to
legitimize US dominance by specifically mentioning “important countries” as if countries
outside of his definition were not important. On the other hand, China has been flexing its
muscles abroad by investing in Africa’s strategic resources—ivory included. In a 2013 article for
Reuters, Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala writes about a specific case in Tanzania where 706 ivory tusks
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were confiscated from Chinese nationals involved in a garlic export business (Ng’wanakilala
2013). The ease in which Chinese companies are able to control the source of illicit ivory
suggests how China’s power has influenced Africa to the point that even illicit markets are being
taken over. As mercantilist policymakers seek regulation to deter possible challenges to the
United States, critics with a structuralist understanding see government intervention as the only
way to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable individuals.
Elephants are not the only subject of exploitation within the illicit ivory trade. Organized
crime leaders also exploit human labor by using their power as leverage to increase profit
margins. The case also remains the same for China. Bartholomäus Grill points out in his article
“Africans Divided Over Chinese Presence” that many South African locals view Chinese
investors as ‘yellow masters’” who use local prisoners as forced labor for construction (2013, 6).
A structuralist would assume that if exploitative practices are common in Africa’s licit markets
due to the flawed nature of capitalism, then the illicit markets surrounded by more violence and
crime would only involve more exploitation because labor policies are virtually nonexistent and
national law is not taken seriously in an illegal “atmosphere.” Beyond the lives of elephants,
government officials enforce policies by recognizing how illegal ivory trade can diminish
humanitarian rights and lead to class disparities in the pursuit of profit. Conversely, constructivist
IPE scholars analyze individuals and how psychology, habits, and discourse develop cultural
norms and shape ideas of conservation to be understood as the morally responsible action for
governments to implement.
Many actors within the political realm seek various perspectives drawn from objective or
structural realities to address state-market interactions, failing to realize that representational or
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constructivist frameworks have an important role in developing widely accepted beliefs and
norms among individuals. Challenging today’s wildlife enforcement institutions, Rosaleen Duffy
examines conservation policy with an insightful constructivist approach. As she discusses the
organizational components of CITES, she recognizes that scientific knowledge problematizes
notions of conservation and biodiversity, which are seen as “politically neutral” and
“uncontested.” Acting as “‘knowledge brokers,’” scientists constitute what David N. Balaam and
Bradford Dillman define as “epistemic communities” in their textbook Introduction to
International Political Economy (2014, 106). According to Duffy, epistemic communities play a
vital role in determining policy outcomes by providing research and dispersing ideas with
scholarly authority (Duffy 2010, 48). Duffy also goes on to discuss the powerful role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in shaping public discourse. Bound together by values like
biodiversity and conservation, NGOs like the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) were
instrumental for the creation of CITES, an IO that now works side-by-side with other various
NGOs. Similar to epistemic communities, NGOs are recognized as “transnational advocacy
networks (TANs),” acting as “‘norm entrepreneurs’” that campaign and lobby to elicit political
responses to the illegal ivory trade (Balaam and Dillman 2014, 105). It is the symbiosis between
TANs, epistemic communities and IOs that constructs societal beliefs about the ivory trade by
standardizing wildlife regulation as a moral responsibility.
Like many commodities being sold on the illicit global market, elephant ivory fuels a
complex supply chain involving specialized individuals who cooperate extensively to achieve
maximum profits. Tracing elephant ivory as it is poached in Tanzania, domestically processed,
and then transported to Chinese markets supports the notion that political actors always look to
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intervene in the market, especially concerning illegal trade. Political actors bring different
perspectives to the table, each focusing on cui bono? or “who benefits?” when assessing the
political-economic situation. Economic liberals primarily remain in favor of relaxing wildlife
trade regulations, claiming that less government intervention diminishes demand in the black
market and creates an overall positive-sum game, while mercantilists understand policies and
interactions between states as architectures of power, which create tensions even when illegal
transactions are involved. Structuralists critique the structure of capitalism and look at how class
disparities and labor exploitation in licit markets correlate to higher levels of exploitation when
individuals operate in an illicit atmosphere with no respect to the law. The constructivist
approach explains how NGOs, scientists, and IOs operate cohesively to manufacture social
norms about wildlife conservation by contributing to political discourse and problematizing
notions of biodiversity. Although on the surface the illicit ivory trade seems to be nothing more
than a shady, large-scale transaction, a multidisciplinary, IPE examination of the supply chain
provokes new insights that are often neglected otherwise.
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